

An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy



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ABSTRACT: Beginning with the overflow of mass emotions which led to uncontrolled collective action causing as many as 135 people to die and more than 750 others to be injured in a sports match. This article analyses a problem that has shocked the people and government in Indonesia and has become one of the most important issues in world football from an institutional perspective. In the first two weeks after the incident, the police, the main football organization in the country, and the event organizers seemed to try to escape responsibility. However, the country's swift move to immediately form a Joint Independent Fact Finding Team (TGIPF) on D+1 two weeks later concluded that the match management had committed many violations of the basic principles as guided by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Through analysis of secondary data, namely news coverage in the mass media, social media, and qualitative analysis of video recordings from interested parties, this article reiterates that ignoring standard standards in the form of official football rules is a fundamental problem as the cause of a human tragedy.

KEYWORDS: field, football, institution, sport industry, tragedy

I. INTRODUCTION

Football matches are the most interesting events among various sports in the world (Memari, Z., et al., 2021; Pifer, N.D., et al., 2018), including in Indonesia. Aside from being a sport, football matches are also an industry in the sports sector (Memari, Z., et al., 2021, Lee, J.W. & Tan, T., 2019) with an entertainment business character (Kelly and Hickey, 2010) which must be managed through attractive management to obtain financial income, whether from ticket sales, advertising or broadcasting (Wang, Y., et al., 2019). However, the Indonesian League football match held on 1 October 2023 has become a national tragedy. It started with a collective mass action that was repressively responded to by the security forces and resulted in 135 deaths.

In "The Crowd: A Study of Popular Mind" published in 1895 (Waddington, D., & King, M., 2005), Le Bon stated that human behavior is dominated by emotion and instinct, not rational thought. This has actually been known to the stakeholders who organized the match between two opposing clubs, namely without the presence of supporters from the visiting team - Persebaya. Russell (2004) stated that if the two supporters meet there will be the potential for riots to occur. However, preventing riots with this policy was not effective enough. The sporadic action of spectators taking to the field massively after the long whistle reflected the mounting dissatisfaction of individuals over the loss of their favorite team. Within minutes, hundreds of spectators were on the pitch chasing players, officials, and referees to express their disappointment. Swear words and various aggressive expressions were shown in response to the match that just ended.


With the masses continuing to pour into the field, the apparatus was drawn into the middle of the field to evacuate players, referees, and officials. At the same time, some of the apparatus took repressive measures by hitting them with sticks and kicking the masses to get them out of the field. However, these efforts did not produce satisfactory results because the overflow of masses that plunged from the stands onto the field was increasing. The situation became heated when the security forces lost control in the face of the masses' growing emotions. Less than an hour later, the apparatus responsible for securing the match, which was equipped with cars armed with water cannons, released tear gas into the air. This was aimed at the masses, both in the middle of the grass and at the spectators still standing in the stands. Forty thousand panicked people ran for a way out which then crammed into a dead end as several exits were closed.

The extraordinary panic at the Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang on October 1 2022 which was experienced by thousands of people resulted in various uncontrollable actions such as pushing each other, crushing each other, falling and being stepped on or trampled on, and continuing to shortness of breath and broken bones until they died. With the number of victims killed and many more suffering from serious and minor injuries. Not only the adult male supporters but the victims of this tragedy as well as the female audience and children. The tragedy has had a devastating impact on the community with families and friends of the victims in shock and grief. The authorities have launched an investigation to identify the incident's cause. Counseling services are offered to those affected by the tragedy. This event became the darkest tragedy in world football in the last 50 years. The Government of

An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy

the Republic of Indonesia, no more than 40 hours after the incident, through the Joint Independent Fact Finding Team (TGIPF) led by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs accompanied by several relevant Ministers, the National Police Chief and the TNI Commander held a press conference and stated the steps to be taken.

The day after the incident, the issue of the Kanjuruhan incident reached its peak based on posts from netizens monitored by Google Trend.



Graph 1: Kanjuruhan Issue on Google Trend

Source: google-trend

This catastrophe that shocked the world is certainly not a mere individual problem or the negligence of the organizers. Instead, it is an institutional problem that occurs at a sporting event packaged as a lucrative business decision. It is known that the sports industry is full of business interests and rent seekers (Morrow & Howleson, 2014; Lee J. W. & Tan, 2019; Memari, Z. et al., 2020; Buck, C. & Ifland, S., 2022). This article will explain institutionally why the biggest human tragedy in sports in the last 5 decades occurred and the various absurdities that surround it.

Methodology

This article begins with conducting desk research through an analysis of the Monitoring and Investigation Report on the Human Tragedy of the Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang on October 1, 2022, by the National Human Rights Committee (Komnas HAM). It also analyzes secondary data in the form of news in the mass media and social media. To explore this matter, a qualitative analysis was carried out with NVivo software on 4 video recordings of press conferences from the parties authorized to handle this case. These recordings were divided into 4 categories: match security strategy, responsible party, FIFA regulations knowledge, and post-tragedy responsibility.

II. DISCUSSION

Following Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994), social problems may be considered as constructed phenomena. This, what constitutes a problem is the concern segments of the public feel about a given condition. This can explain why a heartbreaking tragedy occurred in Kanjuruhan Indonesia.

Football competition has become an industry (Buck, C., & Ifland S., 2022) managed by clubs and institutions by producing entertaining matches through individual and team skill training to create appeal to the public. The football industry market includes more than just the audience watching the match, but also the sponsors and the media covering the event. For this reason, various attractive and attractive designs and packaging are needed so stakeholders get satisfaction and managers get financial benefits. The reciprocal relationship between producers and consumers cannot be separated from a transaction that benefits parties.

Spectators as consumers who need quality attractions have encouraged PSSI as the parent organization of football in Indonesia to present international class matches. For this reason, players from various countries were invited to join in. Since the 1980s football clubs in Indonesia have been strengthened by players from abroad. In other words, the sports industry needs and is even profit-oriented to continue to exist and develop (Kelly, P., & Hickey, C., 2010; Memari, Z. et al., 2010; Maderer, D. et al., 2016; Wang, Y. et al., 2019). For this reason, various strategies and efforts in preparation and implementation were carried out so that the activities were lively with a large number of spectators and coverage as well as with the maximum level of security. A total of 2,034 officers and seconded soldiers have been deployed to prepare for the event. What these actors do in this industry is intended to bring optimal financial benefits.

Initially scheduled for 21.00 WIB (Western Indonesian Time), several days earlier, various parties requested that the match begins in the afternoon at 16.00 WIB according to Indonesian football tradition. The reason for the request for the match implementation to be returned to the usual schedule is also based on concerns about the unpreparedness of public facilities in providing security guarantees for spectators leaving the stadium at night. However, these various arguments were countered by the committee which stated that security readiness and the maturity of the people of the Malang area would guarantee reliable security

An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy

at the match until the spectators returned home. Furthermore, the committee believes that the stadium lighting facilities and the audience attendance control system have been carefully designed, so there is no need to worry.

On the other hand, the organizing committee rejected the police's request that the maximum-security process be carried out for no more than 38,000 spectators. Furthermore, the committee made a compromise with the sponsors, especially the cigarette companies, who requested that the event be held at night. This is because cigarette advertisements can only run after 21:30. With these various considerations, the organizing committee prepared an agenda that was publicly available. This includes security systems for activities inside and outside the stadium. Also, for business purposes, 43,000 tickets were printed.

Based on the release of information from the Malang City Police a few days before the match, it was stated that the number of personnel prepared for the match was 2,034 officers. This means that the number of match spectators reached 42 thousand people, with each officer guarding 20 spectators. This fact is far below the FIFA standard ratio which states that the ratio of officers to spectators is 1 to 4. So, the rulers' logic is that to maintain order, they must take firm and repressive measures to control the crowd to avoid chaos.

Following Trivizas (1980), the actions taken by the responsible parties can be interpreted as anticipation to prevent chaos from arising, according to Gustave Le Bon's theory (Laursen, R. B. and Møller, V., 2017) regarding crowd behavior. What the authorities did was prevent anarchist actions from aggressive mobs as was the opinion of Christian Borch (2013) who stated that rational dialogue was impossible and according to Atak (2017), acts of violence from the police against the masses had become commonplace in the last ten years.

However, the above argument is refuted by Rasmus Beedholm Laursen & Verner Møller (2019) who says that crowd theory has a fundamental weakness, namely simplifying masses which are considered homogeneous and have a tendency to carry out anarchist activities. Fligstein (2008) also rejects theories based on an interactionist approach that sees an event from the actions or behavior of the actors in it. According to the New Institutional Theory, collective behavior can be better explained because an event arises as a result of institutional issues surrounding it (Fligstein, 2008; Beckert, 2010). Football competition can be defined as a field (Beckert, 2010; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) which shows the dynamics between actors in it, causing various changes. This is in line with the opinion of Fligstein (2008) who said that the context of interaction produces and reproduces institutions and Shadnam, M. and Lawrence, T.B. (2011) who said that morality in an organization is socially constructed in nested systems of individuals, organization communities ... that moral collapse is associated with the flows of meaning and social control between levels in these systems - organizations and moral communities and/or between an organization

Further following the logic of Shadnam, M., & Lawrence, T. B. (2011) regarding moral collapse, the institutional ideology and regulations that exist in the minds of fanatical spectators are the teams they support. These teams are Arema as the host must not lose to its sworn enemy - Persebaya as has been the case since 1992. A 3-2 score at the end of the match was something the crowd could not accept, causing an outpouring of anger. The moral community that does not want to lose must accept the fact that defeat causes the community to become aggressive and out of control.

On the other hand, security forces believe activities must be carried out in an orderly manner without commotion. Anything can and should be done. This can be seen in the presence of armored vehicles and water cannons. These vehicles spray tear gas at the crowd in the middle of the field and hit the spectators in the stadium. This is in contrast to the concept of peacemaker from Russell (1998) who stated that the police should act as a peacemaker and prevent riots and not as a catalyst for human tragedies.



Graph 2: Institutional Theory of Moral Collapse
source: Shadnam, M., & Lawrence, T. B. (2011)

Basically, the organizers anticipated emotional conditions and riot threats by designing matches that only Arema F.C. fans could watch live. For the sake of avoiding clashes, Persebaya F.C. supporters were not allowed to enter the stadium. This is an agreement between the two clubs and also applies when Arema visits Persebaya, Aremania cannot enter the stadium.

As the authority for organizing all matches, PSSI appointed PT LIB as the organizer of football matches in Indonesia. This organization is responsible for professionally managing football matches including managing finances. To hold a match between

An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy

two clubs in one place, PT LIB appoints an organizing committee which generally comes from the host club. With the demand to present quality matches, PT LIB, which is a corporation, juxtaposes professionalism in terms of football quality as well as financial benefits.

Business interest in the match can be seen in two different ways: the number of ticket sales and the time the match is held. About 10 days before the Arema FC vs Persebaya match, management agreed to adjust the number of tickets according to the stadium's capacity. A few days before D-Day, the Police had recommended the sale of 38,000 tickets according to the stadium capacity, but the organizing committee still sold 42,000 tickets. The formal argument presented by the Chair of the Organizing Committee said that the normal capacity of the Kanjuruhan Stadium could be filled with 45,000 people. On that basis, the committee decided to provide approximately 43,000 tickets.

Even though on H-1, namely September 29, 2022, the committee received a letter from the Malang Police Chief asking to reduce the number of tickets to 38,000. However, the committee reiterated that tickets would still be sold according to previous orders. The apparatus could not argue further and decided to still issue permits for the match. Because business logic and considerations can tolerate various "violations" or existing weaknesses.

From 1994 to 2014, football competitions in Indonesia were supported by the main sponsors, cigarette manufacturers. However, since 2002, Law No. 32 which prohibits the display of advertisements for cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and additive products in the open, has interfered with sponsorship support. Since the regulation was officially enacted in 2014, the presence of cigarette companies in the cigarette industry and football competitions as the main supporters of football in Indonesia has stopped. As a result of the pandemic, it reappeared in 2022 by taking advantage of the loophole in this policy, namely advertising after 9 p.m.

Following is a table that summarizes news analysis and YouTube video recordings of the soccer match in Kanjuruhan.

Table 1. Main issue and arguments from Organizing Committee

Issue	PSSI	Police/security	Organizing Committee
The number of spectators exceeds the stadium's capacity	Already got permission from the police to print as many as 42,000 tickets	The organizers rejected requests to reduce the number of tickets	Fulfilling public interest so that tickets are printed according to the maximum capacity of the stadium
Use of order equipment contrary to FIFA regulations	Leave everything completely to the police	Not aware of any restrictions. Carry out normal duties	Not aware of FIFA rules and have fully entrusted to the Police
Tear gas spraying	Not responsible	Anticipate that the crowd's protests don't get any worse	Has no authority
As many as 12 of the 14 exit gates of the stadium were closed	The committee and officials are responsible.	Prevent outside crowds from entering the field	Not knowing who did it or who ordered it, it is possible to prevent the crowds outside the stadium from getting inside.

Source: authors (processed from existing news from online media and social media)

Institutional problem

The tragedy in Kanjuruhan can be seen as an institutional problem because violations occur in a systematic and structured manner that occurs repeatedly within an organization (Adnan R.S. et al., 2022; Chang, 2019; Hurnyak et al., 2019). This has been seen before the match started, namely PSSI and PT LIB's indifference to FIFA regulations and statutes. It even violated Article 19 of the FIFA Statutes which requires police officers to be on duty outside the stadium, while the officers concerned inside the stadium are stewards with special certifications. It was only after the rioting that all parties realized that there were officers called stewards who were tasked with protecting spectators and supporters during the match, and not police officers let alone soldiers.

The National Human Rights Commission report showed that institutionally there have been many mistakes that have occurred. It was also seen that the police did not understand the rules and even took action according to the wishes of the organizing committee rather than complying with the standard official rules for football matches. The organizing committee gave the match agenda to the police 2 weeks before D-Day. Nationally, PT LIB has submitted an application for a permit along with the match schedule to the National Police Headquarters. Regionally, it has been submitted to the Regional Police. Even though at first the police considered advancing match hours and reducing the number of tickets sold. However, the police finally agreed to the activities that had been arranged by the committee. It seemed that the police were only following the organizers regarding the schedule of matches at night with more than 40,000 tickets sold, and did not provide further arguments. With not too much difficulty, PT LIB finally got permission to hold the competition according to the scenario they had prepared.

An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy

First, PSSI did not communicate the FIFA Article 19 stadium safety and security regulations to PT Liga Indonesia Baru and the implementing committee. The Joint Independent Fact-Finding Team (TGIPF) led by Menkopolkam found that many instances of football matches not being organized properly occurred at night. The organizers and PSSI did not study the football match system regulations and neither did the security forces led by the Police Agency. Although it does not rule out the possibility that this organization ignores regulations from world-class football institutions.

Second, the Kanjuruhan stadium does not have adequate eligibility to hold a match that has a high-risk match. Even the capacity of spectators exceeds the safe capacity for a match. Third, PSSI involved anti-riot troops from Mobile Brigade Police who brought various anti-riot equipment including tear gas into the stadium. Fourth, PT Liga Indonesia Baru does not provide guidelines for individual quality service standards to prospective implementing committees so that the personnel involved meet the qualifications. Fifth, security and safety officers do not have a certificate that guarantees competence.

Other deviations from the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in organizing matches can also be seen in the mechanism for opening and closing stadium doors. FIFA rules state that stadium doors must be opened 10 minutes before the end of the match. However, the organizing committee made their own decision not to unlock all the doors to stem the crowds outside the stadium from entering. This statement was later corrected by the committee stating that some doors had been opened and others had not been opened. This was because officers had not yet arrived there. Regardless of which statement is true, cases like this show that institutionally there is not enough debriefing from PSSI to the organs under it regarding FIFA standard rules.

Systemic negligence can also be seen in the neglect of the SOP, which clearly prohibits tear gas in stadiums. This is stated in the FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations which prohibit the use of tear gas and firearms as written in Article 19 b. "No firearms or 'crowd control gas' shall be carried or used," according to FIFA's rules.

The Disciplinary Commission from PSSI blamed the implementing committee for the various negligence that took place and refused to acknowledge the fact that the highest institution overseeing football in Indonesia had made a fatal mistake. PSSI seems reluctant to apologize for not monitoring and controlling its institutions. The facts above raise the question, "is it because of too much trust that they act rashly, or because they really don't understand FIFA regulations, or do various related institutions allow over-capacity ticket sales because everyone benefits equally?" Institutional problems can also be seen in the statement by the Joint Independent Fact Finding Team (TGIPF) on the Kanjuruhan Tragedy which questioned the disappearance of some of the CCTV footage with a duration of more than three hours in the main lobby and parking area of Kanjuruhan Stadium. By 22.21 WIB, this CCTV footage was lost or intentionally deleted with a duration of 3 hours 21 minutes 54 seconds.

This institutional problem is reflected in the statement by the Head of the Public Relations Division (Humas) of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) who said that the police officers who fired the tear gas at the Kanjuruhan Stadium, Malang, East Java, were not aware of FIFA's rules regarding the prohibition of use of tear gas in stadiums. Polri explained that its members did not know because they were not notified by the safety and security officer. "Members don't know about the rules anyway, because the safety and security officer didn't convey them and it's prohibited," (Kompas.com, Friday (7/10/2022)). The Head of the Public Relations Division of the National Police said that the safety and security officer is a person who is responsible in As stated in the FIFA statute ratified by PSSI regarding the 2021 edition of safety and security regulations. In this regard, Kontras (an NGO that has always criticized human rights violations in Indonesia) considers TGIPF as if turning a blind eye to the fact that there is legal accountability from superiors. in the use of physical force.

Violation of FIFA statutes is also reflected in the activity of deploying military troops in civilian activities because it has the potential to violate Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI. This is because the Army does not have a duty to secure sports matches and the deployment of military personnel is the President's authority with the approval of the DPR RI. Although no party has taken this matter seriously, PSSI's institutional understanding of existing regulations is relatively low.

Habits and logic of the security system for riots are a reference rather than complying with regulations in football match management. As found by Kontras (the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence), which is part of TGIPF Aremania, which states that the various parties involved are adamant about the logic practiced so far. For example, the security forces did not want to hear information from several parties regarding the ban on the use of tear gas. Even though it was conveyed four times in coordination meetings before the match between the Police, the Organizing Committee, Arema FC Management, Aremania, and other related parties. However, the security forces continued to carry tear gas ammunition on D-Day of the match.

Recurring Institutional Mistakes

PSSI also committed a major violation of regulations and received a strong reprimand from FIFA in 2015. This sanction was imposed by FIFA due to intervention by the Government, in this case, Minister of Youth and Sports (Menpora) Imam Nahrawi who froze PSSI and did not recognize the results of the Extraordinary Congress in Surabaya on April 18. With institutional conflicts among the board involving the Minister, FIFA sanctioned Indonesia.

PSSI also made institutional mistakes in 2015, but the Indonesian football organization again ignored various relevant rules. As an industry, the parties involved are more focused on the financial aspects of management, especially profitability, rather than paying attention to standard operational standards agreed upon internationally. As well as bringing police, soldiers, and tear

An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy

gas into the stadium, institutional errors abounded. The police also acknowledged that the tear gas used during the Kanjuruhan tragedy expired in 2021. However, the Head of the Public Relations Division of the National Police further claimed that all expired tear gas did not contain any lethal chemicals. Despite this, the police are still looking for loopholes that help them claim that the equipment brought by the members was not responsible for the deaths of 130 spectators.

Nvivo's analysis of the recordings of the press conferences of the relevant parties showed that the match security strategy was considered insufficiently mature. As stated by PSSI, due to a significant number of deaths and other losses, the parties to blame were often delegated to the implementing committee. When examined more deeply, it turns out that all football parties did not understand FIFA regulations and did not read them carefully. Therefore, most social media and mass media narratives stated that the party most responsible for the tragedy was PSSI in addition to the organizing committee.

CONCLUSION

The Kanjuruhan tragedy was an institutional problem in Indonesia's football system. Starting with the issue of the physical facilities of the stadium, organization, control mechanisms, and the participation of various interests in various activities. Facts like the above show that institutional problems must be solved by institutional reconstruction, such as the problem of the spread of Covid-19 (Adnan, R. et al., 2022) so that football in Indonesia can become more professional. Institutionally, the state has taken strategic and tactical steps as conveyed by the President of the Republic of Indonesia through a statement on October 5, 2022, by ordering the Minister of Youth and Sports, the General Chairperson of PSSI, and the National Police Chief to thoroughly evaluate the implementation of football matches in the country and improve procedures for match security. However, the question is whether these things can be carried out in a disciplined manner in the near future considering that the general election atmosphere has begun to manifest in early 2023 and will reach its peak in 2024.

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An Institutional Issue on Football Competition, Indonesia League Tragedy

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